Anselm of Canterbury
From Philosopedia
Anselm (1033 or 1034 - 21 April 1109)
Saint Anselm of Canterbury held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109 and is known as the founder of Scholasticism .
He was born in Aosta, a city in the Kingdom of Burgundy (now located in the Italian Alps region of the Aosta Vally, near the borders of France and Switzerland), leaving in 1056 and settling at the Benedictine Abbey of Bec in Normandy. From here he moved to England to succeed Lanfranc as the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093.
Reportedly, Gundulph was his harsh and violent father, while his mother Emmenberga was a virtuous woman who gave him his religious training When 15 and he asked to enter a convent, he was denied permission by his father, resulting in an apparent psychosomatic illness. Finding life unbearable at home, he left in 1059 and at the age of 27 entered the Benedictine Abbey of Bec in Normandy as a novice.
His principles brought him into conflict both with Wiliam II and Henry I, both of whom temporarily exiled him.
A survey of his Cur Deus Homo? explains his thinking concerning anthropology, hamartiology, soteriology, and Christology. The work was the first to argue for the necessity of the Christ's atoning death on the cross.
He was greatly influenced by Augustine and sought "necessary reasons" for religious beliefs, notably writing a famous ontological argument for the existence of God.
Contents |
Anselm’s Ontological Argument
Anselm's Proslogion has several parts, followed by an appendix. The first parts have a common pattern, which pattern dominates the Proslogion as a whole:
Proslogion Ch. I:
- God = that than which nothing greater can be conceived. It is greater to be X rather than Y.
- Therefore, God is either X or something better. Otherwise, we would be involved in a contradiction, God by definition being something that which nothing greater can be conceived.
- (It is the repeated deployment of this same pattern of proof rather than individual bits of argument to which Anselm refers when he explains his single independent proof that You (God) exist as we believe and that You are everything we believe you to be.)
Proslogion Ch. II:
- God truly exists:
- To exist both in reality and in the understanding is greater than merely to exist in the understanding.
Proslogion Ch. IIIa:
- God exists so truly that he cannot even be thought not to exist.
- Something whose non-existence is inconceivable is greater than anything whose non-existence is conceivable.
Proslogion Ch. IIIb:
- You are this being, O Lord our God:
- You alone are something that which nothing greater can be conceived. You alone exist most truly and thus most greatly of all.
Proslogion Ch. IV:
- Appendix: how come the fool can say in his heart what cannot even be consistently thought.
Objections to the Ontological Argument
In Anselm's own lifetime his ontological argument was opposed by a monk named Gaunilo, whose main attack on the ontological argument was found in his illustration of a perfect island. He reasoned that we have just as much right in concluding that God exists merely from our idea of a perfect Being as we do in concluding the existence of a perfect island solely from our idea of a perfect island.
To this, Anselm responded by stating that the analogy between a perfect island and a perfect Being breaks down. For the idea of a perfect island does not include its existence, while the idea of a perfect Being does entail its existence. Anselm accused Gaunilo of not understanding what Anselm's argument was actually saying. Today, many philosophers agree that Gaunilo did in fact misunderstand Anselm's argument.
Still, this does not mean that Anselm's ontological argument cannot be refuted. Immanuel Kant believed that Anselm's argument was fallacious. Kant stated that the deficiency of Anselm's argument was in Anselm's view that existence is a perfection. The concept of God as a Being who has all perfections does not entail the existence of that Being because existence is not a perfection. Existence does not change, in any way the concept of a being - it merely posits actual existence to that being. To say that something has existence is to say that it actually exists outside the mind. The concept of a perfect Being who exists is no greater than the concept of a perfect Being who does not exist. They are the same concept, though one has existence while the other does not. Therefore, as far as Kant was concerned, it is faulty reasoning to go from the realm of pure thought to the realm of actual existence by treating existence as one of the perfections that the most perfect Being must have.
From Kant's time on, this has become the primary objection to the ontological argument. Still, many philosophers who agree with this criticism believe that it only applies to the first type of Anselm's ontological argument. They believe that Anselm's second argument remains intact despite Kant's critique. Two of these philosophers are Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm.
Restatements of the Ontological Argument
Norman Malcolm defended Anselm's second type of ontological argument. Malcolm reasoned that the existence of a necessary Being can either be necessary (it cannot not exist), impossible (it cannot exist), or possible (it may or may not exist). Malcolm stated that since no one has shown the concept of a necessary Being to be contradictory (logically impossible), then the existence of a necessary Being is possible. If it is possible for a necessary Being to exist, then it must exist. It is a contradiction to say that a being which cannot not exist (a necessary Being) may or may not exist. Therefore, a necessary being must exist. The heart of Malcolm's argument can be stated as follows. By definition, a necessary Being cannot not exist. Therefore, a necessary Being must exist. However, Malcolm admits a weakness in his argument. He concedes that he is unaware of any way to prove that there is no contradiction in the concept of a necessary Being. Therefore, it is logically possible that the concept of a necessary Being is contradictory. Hence, it may be the case that it is impossible for a necessary Being to exist. Therefore, at best, Malcolm's ontological argument only shows that it is probable that a necessary Being exists. For it is always possible that someone will someday show that the concept of a necessary Being is contradictory.
Another modern restatement of the ontological argument comes from Alvin Plantinga. After years of examining and critiquing the ontological argument, Plantinga proposed his own version of the argument. Though Plantinga viewed Anselm's argument as problematic, Plantinga considers his own argument as valid.
Plantinga argued that the greatest possible Being would have to be a being that exists as the greatest possible Being in every possible world. Plantinga concludes that since the actual world is a possible world (it is not an impossible world), then the greatest possible being must exist in the actual world.
Though Plantinga's argument appears valid, it ceases to be an ontological argument. Its premises leave the realm of pure reason by assuming the existence of the actual world. By definition, an ontological argument must prove God's existence from the mere concept of God. The other arguments for God's existence begin with something that actually exists and then argue to the existence of God. Plantinga's argument should be classified as a type of cosmological argument. It starts with the existence of the actual world and then argues to God's existence.
Christian philosophers Norman Geisler and Winfried Corduan consider this the downfall of the ontological argument. For it is always logically possible that nothing exists. Therefore, in order for the ontological argument to work, it must start with the premise, "something exists." But, then it is no longer an ontological argument. It starts with actual existence, not pure thought.
The Dark-side Version of the Ontological Argument
Eric Walther has argued that a "dark-side" version of the Ontological Argument is actually more persuasive than the conventional version. Consider the concept of a Being than which nothing more evil can be conceived. At first, of course, one thinks of it as merely a concept. But then consider: wouldn't an evil Being that doesn't actually exist, be far less evil than one that does actually exist?
Compare evil with good in this regard. At first it seems that goodness which actually exists is better than goodness which does not exist, but on the other hand is it not possible that the infinite goodness existing as an ideal is even better than actually-existing infinite goodness? Isn't that essentially one of the standard ways of "solving" the problem of evil? By contrast, nobody could say that infinite evil existing only as an ideal is more evil than an actually-existing infinite evil. Ergo malum est? Or is this a reductio of the whole concept-to-actuality inference?
Probably Aprocryphal
There is a story (probably apocryphal, unfortunately) that as Bertrand Russell was walking across the courtyard one day, idly turning over thoughts in his head, he suddenly stopped dead and exclaimed "By Jove! The Ontological Argument is valid!!!" He had for the first time fully experienced the intuitive power of that inference from conceptual possibility to actual existence. Luckily, by the time he finished crossing the courtyard he had rediscovered the flaw in the inference. This could illustrate that, unless you've had a similar experience, you're not really qualified to talk about the Ontological Argument.
Conclusion
An examination of Anselm's ontological argument has produced several observations. First, most philosophers believe that Immanuel Kant has successfully refuted Anselm's first argument. Second, Norman Malcolm's version of Anselm's second ontological argument leaves the realm of logical necessity since he admits he cannot prove that the concept of a necessary Being is not an impossible being. In other words, Malcolm admits that it is possible that someone will someday prove that the concept of a Necessary Being involves a contradiction. Therefore, his argument, if successful, could only prove that God probably exists. And, third, Plantinga showed that the only apparent way to rescue the ontological argument is to begin with the cosmological premise that something exists. But, then the ontological argument is no longer ontological; it leaves the realm of pure reason.
Final Days
William was killed in 1100 and his successor, Henry I, at once invited Anselm to return to England. But Henry demanded that Anselm should again receive from him in person investiture in his office of archbishop. The papal rule in this matter was plain: all homage and lay investiture were strictly prohibited. Anselm represented this to the king; but Henry would not relinquish a privilege possessed by his predecessors, and proposed that the matter should be laid before the Holy See. The answer of the pope reaffirmed the papal rule as to investiture. A second embassy was sent, with a similar result. Henry, however, remained firm, and at last, in 1103, Anselm and an envoy from the king set out for Rome. The pope, Paschal II, reaffirmed strongly the rule of investiture, and passed sentence of excommunication against all who had infringed the law, excepting King Henry.
This left matters essentially as they were, and Anselm, who had received a message forbidding him to return to England unless on the king's terms, withdrew to Lyons, where he waited to see if Paschal would not take stronger measures. At last, in 1105, he resolved himself to excommunicate Henry. His intention was made known to the king through his sister, and it seriously alarmed him, for it was a critical period in his affairs. A meeting was arranged, and a reconciliation between them effected. In 1106 Anselm crossed to England, with power from the pope to remove the sentence of excommunication from the illegally invested churchmen. In 1107 the long dispute as to investiture was finally ended by the king resigning his formal rights, and Anselm was allowed to return to England. The remaining two years of his life were spent in the duties of his archbishopric.
Anselm of Canterbury died on April 21, 1109, and was canonized in 1494 by Alexander VI.
